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Monday, March 31, 2014

Stressed Out!

Credit: American Banker


The chart (above) comes from an engaging article by Victoria Finkle in the American Banker entitled Fed's Dodd-Frank Stress Test Results a Mixed Bag for Banks.  The chart lists the Dodd-Frank Act large bank stress test results under the Federal Reserve's most severe adverse macroeconomic and marketplace scenario.

A few observations... First, among these 30 large banks, the adverse scenario stress testing results vary widely.  Second, although almost all "passed" the adverse scenario stress test standard, you can see a significant variance in the degree of vulnerability among the players in the group.  Third, in an efficient market, (hopefully) those vulnerabilities would be reflected in the share prices of these banking giants.  Shares of banks with fortress balance sheets, relative to their peers, should command higher premiums.

Let's read the entrails of these large bank stress test results and talk about a "message within the message" as it relates to a totally different group of banks - community banks.  In particular, the role of stress testing in the context of the rapidly increasing pace of community bank merger and acquisition (M&A) activity over the last few months.

How many potential acquirors use adverse scenario stress testing to determine if a vulnerability discount needs to be included in the list of valuation "marks" when doing due diligence and determining an offering price?   ... particularly if folding in the target bank would weaken the pro-forma combined banking operation in an adverse scenario stress test.

How many potential community bank acquirees fail to include an adverse scenario stress test vulnerability premium  if the bank they are selling is contributing to the strengthening or fortification of the pro-forma combined banking operation in an adverse scenario stress test?  ... particularly if the purchase transaction involves an exchange-of-shares component.   Do you, as a seller, want to leave significant shareholder value potentially unaccounted for and left on the table?

How many potential community bank deal-makers are even looking at adverse scenario stress testing in the due diligence process?  How many model severe adverse scenarios through the balance sheet and P&L of the target bank or model those same scenarios through the pro-forma balance sheet and P&L of the proposed combined banking operation?

Sure, there's the loan, investment security, premises, etc. "markup/markdown" process on both sides of the target bank's balance (and off-balance) sheet, but those are generally in the context of conditions as they exist today.  Marks will likewise be adjusted for as-of date credit quality and possibly risk-adjusted so that those numbers account for required regulatory capital set-asides.  Interest rate risk given vaguely-defined directional assumptions about the term structure of interest rates might also be reflected.  But do the due diligence marks and external macroeconomic and marketplace variables come together in a structured, data-driven stress test?

If so, you wouldn't know it if you read the community bank M&A deal press releases.  These proclamations always seem to fit the same old M&A template - price-to-book value, price-times-earnings, earnings accretion timeframes, cost savings claims, the scope of the geographic footprint, leveraging talent, and, oh yeah, those deliciously vague "synergies".  Remember the definition of synergy from business school?  The whole is greater than the sum of its parts (e.g., 2 plus 2 equals 5).

In the fields of science and mathematics, the opposite of synergy is dysergy. Without solid adverse scenario stress testing in the due diligence process, a bank acquiror may be flirting with dysergy.  In the banking arithmetic we old-timers were taught, 2 minus 2 equals "you are now out of capital".   In dysergistic banking terms, the hole is deeper than the remainder of its parts (e.g., 2 minus 2 equals "a hole deeper than you ever imagined").

How do you integrate adverse scenario stress testing into the community bank M&A due diligence process?  Accept and internalize the fact that stress testing is more than a "best" or "helpful" practice, it is a core analytical competency for those community banks bent on acquisition or open to it.

Guidance and tools are available.  For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) provides excellent guidance to federally-chartered national banks and savings associations in two key guidance documents:  Community Bank Stress Testing:  Supervisory Guidance (OCC 2012-33) and Guidance for Evaluating Capital Planning and Adequacy (OCC 2012-16).  Though their requirements are targeted to federally-chartered depository institutions, the underlying concepts are fundamental, universal and generally applicable.

The OCC also provides national banks and federal savings associations access to specific stress testing tools for agricultural loans, acquisition & development loans, individual commercial real estate loans, and a portfolio commercial real estate stress test through its secure web site BankNet.  In addition, OCC's district and national experts are available for technical consultation and are only a phone call away.

Professional support is also available from other sources, including other bank regulatory agencies and trade associations.  There are professional services firms who use call report data to do rough, but reasonable, stress test modeling.  Others use defined data-sets from commonly-used vendor operating platforms.  Others offer true stress test customization at a higher price.

Adverse scenario stress testing should be part of your community bank M&A due diligence "to-do" list and part of your proforma combined operation modeling.  Wise buyers and sellers ought to be adding vulnerability premiums or a vulnerability discounts to pricing models to holistically account for risk, support capital planning objectives, and buttress strategic contingency management imperatives.





Sunday, March 9, 2014



Banks are Social Networks



You might wonder what went through the mind of James W. Marshall, who discovered a gold nugget in the American River on January 24, 1848.  It's doubtful that he fully realized that his discovery would set set off the great California gold rush and the hordes of "49-ers" who would jump start the fortunes of what would shortly become the great State of  California.

Roll the clock forward to early 21st century Silicon Valley, California and what Wikipedia calls Web 2.0 - the second stage of the development of the World Wide Web - characterized especially by the change from static web pages to dynamic or user-generated content and the growth of social networking.  Today, we are living through Web 2.0's own evolution: Mobile Web 2.0 - services that integrate the social web with the core components of mobility - personal, localized, always-on, and ever-present.

The list of these Web-based social networks, though presently dominated by the likes of Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, is growing continuously.  Each is seeking to add value (and riches to their founders) by metaphorically finding gold nuggets in attractive niches within our global social geography.  In the management consultant lexicon, the sponsors of Mobile Web 2.0 are sorting themselves into well-known commercial categories - scale players, niche players, and the occasionally successful "all-in" risk-takers - the disruptors.

Bankers have not been silent about the rising competitive threats to their industry. The trade publications have long been running warning pieces of the Paul Revere genre ("The British are coming! the British are coming!").  Most pointing out that the banking industry may soon be caught in the middle of a classic military pincer movement... with peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding threatening the asset side of the balance sheet and the numerous nonbank-sponsored online payments alternatives laying siege to the liability side.

Other authors, like Francisco Gonzalez, Chairman and Chief Executive of the global Spanish bank BBVA, recently raised the starkest of choices:  Banks need to take on Amazon and Google or die.  He warns that banks need to turn to their vast array of accumulated customer data and leverage it to provide customers "exactly what they want, precisely how and when they need it."

Even others, like the recent article, The Next Big Thing You Missed:  How Starbucks Could Replace Your Bank, focus on the creeping encroachment of bank-like services like prepaid card channels and Lego-like snap-together banks, like Simple.

Almost everyone in the industry is raising red or yellow flags about what I'll call an emerging synthetic banking system.  Don't even bother to paint the emerging competition as "shadow banks", these "synthetic banks" are perfectly prepared to fight hand-to-hand combat in the bright sunshine of both Main Street and Wall Street.

Unfortunately, the odds may favor the invaders over time, as they have neither the ponderous weight of government banking regulation, nor high sunk-costs in legacy operations.  Akin to that of ancient Rome, the invaders may also be aided by the inertia of our industry's business culture - where, inevitably, denial always precedes defense.

What's a classic bank to do?  The famous general Sun Tzu, in his classic The Art of War, advised "Know yourself and you will win all battles".  That self-knowledge should begin with the fact that fundamentally:  All banks are social networks.  Your customers are to you, like "followers" are to Twitter, or  "connections" are to LinkedIn, or "users" are to Facebook.  Your customers are networked to your bank because they have chosen you as a trusted advisor and provider of needed financial services.

In the present stage of the banking industry's Mobile Web 2.0 development, the bulk of the emphasis has been on non-social, vertical networking (bank customer-to-bank).  Because we are talking about confidential financial affairs, this vertical communications channel is both "armored" and "hardened" to provide the requisite account privacy, security and other safeguards.  Within the armored and hardened vertical communication channels, many banks are making great strides in improving customer engagement and loyalty to the bank.

There is also a non-armored and non-hardened part of the vertical (bank customer-to-bank) communication channel that passes for social networking by many banks - the Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook fluffy marketing stuff, non-specific customer assistance, financial literacy education, public service announcements, and those happy, giggly posts like "It's Friday, we here at AnyBank want you to have a terrifically enjoyable weekend!"

That's a centralized customer communications model that talks "at" people and not really "with" people.  There is an audience lurking, but unfortunately not interacting among themselves, within 'the social network that is a bank'.

Where is the horizontal (bank customer-to-bank customer) networking?  I'm talking about the kind of horizontal networking that makes the social networks (like Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook) so popular and highly-used?  Where is the bank customer-to-bank customer horizontal communication interactions on financial or business topics of mutual or common interest?

If you don't think it is possible to have business-like social networking, just look at the success (and soaring stock price) of LinkedIn.com.  Horizontal social interaction is where 'the social network that is a bank' is not being profitably leveraged enough to check the competitive pressures from both banks and nonbank/synthetic banks.

How can a bank build revenue from these horizontal social interactions?  Consider the power of lightly-moderated online forums.  Let's take for instance, and for the sake of discussion, your neo-entrepreneur customers who run innovative internet-based or "brick-and-click" businesses.  They share a common social bond as far as the operations of their businesses are concerned.

In a lightly-moderated online forum, you would have customers sharing thoughts, ideas, and problem-solving among other people with common business interests and who also share a common financial product provider (remember they are already your bank customers).  This pool of horizontal online social interactions provides an avenue to promote the availability of the bank's credit, payments, treasury, and investment/wealth management services opportunistically in the context of the shared business needs of a specific customer segment.

Moreover, it's also an excellent opportunity to refer customers to vetted outside professional services providers... some of whom may also be (now very grateful) bank customers.  Lastly, it also provides valuable customer feedback on the quality of your own banking products or may reveal gaps in your menu of financial product offerings.  Therein lies the untapped potential of a true social network.

Add a high-touch component to the high-tech approach with occasional physical social events over coffee and snacks, luncheons with guest speakers, or wine-and-cheese evenings to further cement a sense of affiliation and relationship with the bank.

By verticalizing confidential personal financial matters in armored and hardened channels and horizontalizing social interactions among bank customer segments with common interests, both virtually and physically, you have the potential to capture some share of that person-to-person networking allure that the Facebooks, Twitters, and LinkedIns presently offer.

Thinking about your bank as a social network is not a cure for the constant competitive pressures coming from the emerging synthetic banking system, but not losing yardage (and hopefully gaining yardage) can keep you in the game.

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Officially Distorted

 

Recent controversy about the officiating at the Sochi Winter Olympics sparked a thought about how the 2008 financial crisis, and the aftermath we are living in today, have, hopefully, only temporarily distorted the traditional role of bank regulators in the marketplace for banking services.

Historically, as a bank regulator and bank examiner, your job was to calmly officiate in the marketplace for banking services.   As a member of a rulemaking body, subject to statutory guidance and notice-and-comment rulemaking, you helped establish the dimensions of the ball field and rules for player behavior.   In your day-to-day job as a bank examiner, you were also an umpire or referee on the field who monitored player behavior, called out-of-bounds play, and penalized some for personal fouls.  And as a corollary part of the job of officiating, you sometimes had to sideline someone from play or, in grave situations, ask the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to carry an ailing player off the field on a stretcher.

The game itself, though, was played by teams of bankers, doing what bankers do well - making a visible contribution to a safe, sound,and prosperous banking system that is earnestly attending to the legitimate credit needs of the most powerful economy on Earth.

Like any sports competition, the fans show up to the game to applaud the performance of the players on the field and appreciate the quality of the game play. None of the fans came specifically to see the game officials... except maybe the spouses, kids, or significant others of the officials themselves.

But you pick up any national or banking trade media publication these days and there are tons of copy tilted toward the topics of regulation, compliance, and policing unsavory banking behavior and only a smattering of news coverage about trends, tools, and techniques for scoring the game's goals.

Every fan knows that when the game's center of attention becomes the officiating, there is something grossly wrong with the game.  The game should be about the bankers and not the officials.  Hell, even the officials on the field, diligently doing their jobs, would  prefer the spotlight shine on the players and the goals of the game itself.   How many bank regulators relish the prospect of being summoned up to Capitol Hill for congressional video replays of every close call they make (or should  have made) in the scrum down on the playing field?

Like the Polar Vortex that brought us one of the chilliest winters in recent memory, the regulatory "Big Chill" on the banking marketplace seems to be showing small signs of a Spring thaw.  Although there do seem to be a couple of exceptions to this hypothesis.... the activities of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the continuing gang-beating of the global megabanks.

First, while there is still much to do on the Dodd-Frank Act implementation, the outlines of major unfinished rules are generally visible, and there are signs that the rulemaking process is beginning to slowly wind down.  Regulators appear to be just as fatigued with this seemingly endless process as the banking community.

Second, bank enforcement actions are being terminated by regulators at a rapid clip as the level, and direction, of bank prudential risk metrics are improving as banks have finally worked through most of their legacy problems.

Third, bank merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity has been popping in the last few months.  Acquisitive-minded  banks have emerged from their financial storm shelters as the climate seems to be more hospitable.  In 2013, the average unasssisted community bank acquisition crept out of the discount-to-book zone and rose to around 1.2X book value and 25X earnings.

Lastly, based on my unscientific poll, bank consultants, on the community bank beat, who practice in the regulatory relations arena are getting fewer phone calls from bankers desirous of those specific services.  Inquiries now tend to tilt towards corporate governance, regulation implementation, expert witness, and due diligence work.

I think if this "Washington Spring" is real, the roles of the players and the officials should start normalizing over the next three years or so.

Like sports officiating, banking regulation and supervision was not meant to be a public limelight and celebrity status area of professional practice.  The public attention should deservedly go to the competitors in the marketplace.  And again like sports officials, their professional satisfaction should come from being tacitly appreciated for the fair, dedicated, and quietly professional execution of their official responsibilities.





Tuesday, January 21, 2014

Strong Coffee and Weak Tea



On January 16, 2014, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) to amend the existing 12 CFR 30 - Safety and Soundness Standards by establishing a set of formal safety and soundness standards specifically for the 21 national banks and federal savings associations with total assets greater than $50 billion.  These proposed safety and soundness standards (called Appendix D) are based on the OCC's heightened expectations program implemented for large national banks after the financial crisis.

The heightened expectations program was established to strengthen the governance and risk management practices in the OCC's largest banks.  The heightened expectations are that corporate governance and risk management practices in our nation's largest national banks need to be strong, not merely satisfactory.

The proposed guidelines set forth the minimum standards for the design and implementation of an institution’s risk governance framework and provide minimum standards for oversight of that framework by the board of directors.  The guidelines include provisions regarding:

  • The roles and responsibilities of those organizational units that are fundamental to the design and implementation of the risk governance framework. These units are front line units, independent risk management, and internal audit. Together, these units should establish an appropriate system to manage risk taking.
  • A comprehensive written statement that articulates the bank’s risk appetite, which serves as a basis for the risk governance framework. This statement should include both qualitative components and quantitative limits.
  • Board of directors’ oversight of a bank’s compliance with safe and sound banking practices. The board should ensure that the bank establishes and implements an effective risk governance framework that complies with the guidelines.
  • Active board oversight of a bank’s risk-taking activities. This includes establishing accountability for management’s adherence to the risk governance framework. The board should also evaluate management’s recommendations and decisions by questioning, challenging, and, when necessary, opposing, management proposals that could lead to excessive risk taking or pose a threat to safety and soundness.
  • Composition of the board of directors. A board of directors should have at least two independent members who are not part of the bank’s or the parent company’s management.

The OCC is stepping out in front of the other federal bank regulatory agencies with specific and enforceable safety and soundness guidelines.  You may have a different opinion, but frankly, prior to the OCC's heightened expectations program, governance and risk management guidance from all of the federal bank regulatory agencies read like little sermonettes - long on concepts and generalities, short on specifics and practical application.  This present high level of clear communication and transparency regarding OCC's expectations for large national banks is unique and refreshing among the federal bank regulatory agencies.  No hole cards and no guessing.  

Regarding the proposal... First, you cannot appreciate the sheer ecstasy that comes from finally being able to read a post-financial crisis Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that does not run several hundred pages in length.  This NPR is (only) 79 pages long.

Second, this NPR could as easily have been called the "Banking Consultant Screamingly Delicious Increase in Profits Regulation".  Bank consulting firms have already been engaged in the existing informal heightened expectations initiative, but now I anticipate that the combination of formalizing these safety and soundness standards in the Code of Federal Regulations and waving the stick of legal enforcement will have the boards of large banks further shoring up their fiduciary responsibility bona fides by requesting (and paying for) deeper dives.

The first four major provisions of the proposal (bulleted above) are the strong coffee. Read the details in the NPR and I think you will agree.  These are some meaty governance and risk management requirements that are very challenging to implement in large and complex organizations.

I thought the strong coffee provisions of the NPR were well thought out and organized.  My major concern centers on the approval of the resource budgets for what the NPR calls "independent risk management" and the "internal audit" functions.

While the board approves the appointment, removal, compensation, and salary adjustments for the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) and Chief Risk Executive (CRE), the specific language in the proposed regulation amendment itself is silent as to who is approving their resource budgets.  Resource budgets are a major determinant of the efficacy of these critical control functions.

The Supplementary Information section of the NPR indicates that, for internal audit functions (and CAEs) reporting to the Board's audit committee, the board, the board audit committee, or its chair, would oversee resource budgeting (among other functions).  On the other hand, for the CRE (and the administration of the "indpendent risk management function"), the CEO oversees the resource budgeting.  This disparity should be fixed in order to create equivalency in the checks-and-balances framework for both critical control functions.  The Board of Directors, or committee thereof, ought to approve, the appointment, removal, compensation, salary adjustment, and resource budgets for the CAE and the CRE.  

The weak tea is the fifth major provision of the NPR:  A board of directors should have at least two independent members who are not part of the bank’s or the parent company’s management.

That just doesn't square with a meaningful interpretation of the concept of credible challenge, published corporate governance best practice recommendations, and the elevated post-financial crisis public interest in the operations of these banking giants.  This specific proposal only serves to re-enact Custer's Last Stand at the Little Bighorn, except in the boardrooms of our largest banks, as the two independent directors will be seriously out-gunned by inside board members who run the daily operations of the bank.

Best practice for corporate audit committees, for example, is to have them consist of independent directors.  Two independent directors would not make a credible audit committee in our nation's largest banks.  Banks of this size, and weighing their systemic impact on the national and global economies, should ideally have a majority of directors be independent directors, not a symbolic lonesome twosome.

Hopefully, respected best practice organizations like the American Association of Bank Directors , the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the Conference Board can inform this process with their long experience and expertise on board-level governance by submitting comments on this provision of the NPR.

Otherwise, as a peripheral issue, it will also be interesting to see if there are any bank regulatory geopolitical ramifications to all of this.  As of 9/30, there were 33 banks with total assets over $50 billion.  21 of them are national banks and federal savings associations.  That leaves 12 state-chartered banks and savings associations that are supervised, at the federal level, by the Federal Reserve or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  These state-chartered banks and savings associations were not subject to the informal heightened expectations program and will not be subject to the legally enforceable safety and soundness standards outlined in the NPR. 

I've railed about the OCC's excessive "rainy day" reserves (a FY 2012 net position of over $1 billion) in past blog postings.  I'm biting my tongue now on the topic.  Any tiny movement between federal and state bank charters in banks of this size can be seismic in terms of bank supervision workday impact as well as the number and geographic distribution of large bank examiners. 

Overall, this NPR is a bold example of leadership by Tom Curry, the Comptroller of the Currency.  In the same tradition of the leadership the agency exhibited in the previous amendment to the OCC's safety and soundness standards.  In February 2005, the OCC added Appendix C to 12 CFR 30 - Standards for National Banks' Residential Mortgage Lending Practices.  Those rules may have come a little late given the froth and craziness in the mortgage markets prior to the financial crisis, but it was also a courageous step by an Acting Comptroller of the Currency to do what needed to be done, at a time when timidity ruled in the interagency bank regulatory forum.


Monday, January 13, 2014

What's Wrong with Being Balkan?



On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) for Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Foreign Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies.  At 306 pages, this portion of Regulation YY outlined a revised architecture of enhanced prudential standards for Foreign Banking Organizations (FBOs).  Those standards include risk-based capital and leverage requirements, liquidity standards, risk management and risk committee requirements, single-counterparty credit limits, and stress testing requirements.

Well, it's been over a year now and the only sound coming from the Fed at this point is the sound of crickets chirping in an empty room.   The effort to implement these prudential standards has been reportedly stymied by objections by certain foreign countries, foreign bank lobbying groups, and trade associations representing large U.S. banks who fear in-kind retaliation - "reciprocal responses" for the diplomatically inclined.  62 discrete comment letters have been filed to-date by various entities, along with 925 form letters.

The major sticking point is the requirement to establish a U.S.-domiciled Intermediate Holding Company (IHC) for banks with total global assets exceeding $50 billion and whose non-branch assets in the U.S. exceed $10 billion.  All IHCs would be subject to U.S. Bank Holding Company (BHC) capital standards. Additionally, U.S. IHCs with assets between $10 billion and $50 billion would be subject to Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) company-run stress testing requirements.  IHCs with assets greater than $50 billion would be subject to all DFA stress-test rules and be subject to monthly liquidity stress tests and in-country liquidity requirements.

Here was the Fed's rationale as outlined in the NPR:
"Actions by a home country to constrain a banking organization's ability to provide support to its foreign organizations, as well as the diminished likelihood that home country governments of large banking organizations would provide a backstop to their banks' foreign operations, have called into question one of the fundamental elements of the Board's current approach to supervising foreign banking organizations – the ability of the Board, as a host supervisor, to rely on a foreign banking organization to act as a source of strength to its U.S. operations when the foreign banking organization is under stress.
The issues described above-- growth over time in U.S. financial stability risks posed by foreign banking organizations individually and as a group, the need to minimize destabilizing pro-cyclical ring-fencing in a crisis, persistent impediments to effective cross-border resolution, and limitations on parent support-- together underscore the need for enhancements to foreign bank regulation in the United States.”
Comment letters on the proposed Fed regulation were rich with accusations that this would create "balkanization" in the global banking system.  Timothy Adams, representing the Institute of International Finance (IIF) included this in his comment letter to the Fed objecting to the rule:
"... Regulatory fragmentation can be seen through the increasingly national approaches in key reform areas, such as provisions for resolution of failing firms, and capital and liquidity requirements. Differentiation in the implementation of globally agreed standards and domestic bias in supervisory practices, have also contributed to a sense of financial "Balkanization"... "
The joint comment letter submitted by The Clearing House, the American Bankers Association, and the Financial Services Roundtable, included the following:
"The Associations believe that the Proposal's approach, which would necessarily involve the balkanization of a sizable share of the global banking system along national borders, could both impair economic recovery and growth and increase, rather than diminish systemic risk."
Referred to in a couple of other comment letters is a quote from current Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board (and former Bank of Canada Governor) Mark Carney:
"Left unchecked, these trends could substantially decrease the efficiency of the global financial system. In addition, a more balkanized system that concentrates risk within national borders would reduce systemic resilience globally."
Folks, may I have permission to speak up and support the terms "balkan" and "balkanization"?  Using the terms "balkan" and "balkanization" as accusations, epithets, and terms of derision, masks the fact that spreading your risk (and your risk cushions) represents an important concept in the field of prudent risk management.  The U.S. learned many years ago... you don't anchor your entire Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

In most of the letters arguing against the proposed regulation, there is a certain idealistic and Utopian tone to how the global financial system, and its system of global regulatory coordination, works.  Prudential supervision, from a host country banking supervisor's perspective, is worrying about how to deal with the downside of risk as it impacts the constituency who appointed you to be their steward.  Sure, one can go overboard on protecting ones own citizenry, but there is a middle ground... and I believe the Fed tried to find it.  Maybe as the good work of constructing a global regulatory framework nears that Utopian ideal and when the bad memories fade about how imperfect the global financial system presently is, then it may be time to peel back the national ring-fencing of risk, capital, and liquidity.

Some of the comments against the proposed Fed regulation also seem to assume, with a prophet's degree of certainty, that all that needs to be known about macro-prudential risk is indeed known.  And I think that is because the global financial crisis painted the macro-prudential risk landscape with brilliant hues.  The problems presented in the aftermath of the financial crisis were so stark and easily visible (if not blindingly so) to everyone... liquidity stresses, market collapse, credit quality deterioration, etc.  These risk issues, having leviathan proportions, served to provide unmistakable targets for problem resolution, risk remediation, and regulatory action.

As we all know, the financial crisis and the concurrent economic slump are slowly becoming rear-view mirror issues and the condition of bank balance sheets is slowly improving.  The risk landscape will no longer provide such obvious and actionable cues.  Quickly departing are the days when risk management priorities are handed to bankers (and bank regulators) like low-hanging fruit.

We are moving into a business environment where the emerging risk cues will either be small, subtle, and creeping, or alternatively, immediate, surprisingly radioactive, and potentially explosive.  The direction and momentum of the banking industry itself also seems to be changing by moving away from the protective inward focus that comes from nursing your wounds, apologizing for past sins, and paying fines for violating laws.  Force projection, as the generals and admirals call it, will begin to make a stronger comeback this year, particularly in the regional banks.

We are getting back to expecting the unexpected... that's why it's so important to implement all of the Dodd-Frank Act enhanced prudential standards as soon as possible.

Monday, December 23, 2013

The Pricing of Greatness


Credit: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas - Q2 2012


Even within the population of 12 U.S. megabanks, as defined in the Fed's infographic above, there is a deep gorge between the on-balance sheet asset size of the big four commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States (JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup, Inc., and Wells Fargo & Co.) and the rest of the six commercial banks in U.S banking's top ten.  You could add the total assets of the banking companies from the fifth position through the tenth position and they would best Wells Fargo & Co, but only tie with Citigroup, Inc. 

At 9/30/2013, JP Morgan Chase & Co led the heavyweight division at $2.5 trillion in reported assets;  Bank of America Corp. tipped the scales at $2.1 trillion;  Citigroup, Inc. was at $1.9 trillion; and Wells Fargo & Co. followed with $1.5 trillion. The combined assets of all of the rest of the banks in U.S. banking's Big Ten - Bank of New York Mellon Corp. ($372B), U.S. Bancorp ($361B), HSBC North America Holdings ($309B), PNC Financial Services Group ($309B), Capital One Financial Corp. ($290B), and TD Bank US Holding Co. ($232B) - totaled $1.9 trillion.

My list differs from the Fed's official BHC list because mine has been adjusted to exclude the bank holding companies for the entities that are primarily investment banks, insurers, or commercial finance companies.  Those would be:  The Goldman Sachs Group ($923B),  Morgan Stanley ($832B), American International Group ($541B), and General Electric Capital Corporation ($529B).

The commercial banking industry is more concentrated now than it was at the beginning of the most recent financial crisis.  By one account, the largest banks, as a group, have become 37% larger owing to the effects of financial crisis emergency bank mergers, on one hand, and the shrinkage of the number of banks as a group, as a result of banks that were allowed to fail and the dearth of new de novo banks, on the other hand.

We are rightly preoccupied and mesmerized today with the remaining Dodd-Frank Act implementing regulations.  The context of our present focus on the issue of banking market concentration is on how it is related to Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF).   But the market concentration statistics outlined above may also give us an inkling of an emerging industry battleground once Dodd-Frank becomes a rear-view mirror issue - the oligopolistic market pricing power of the megabanks and how they could use that pricing power to turbocharge their own organic growth at the expense of their competitors, the regional and community banks.

Remember that Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act established a financial sector concentration limit that prohibits, with only a few very specific exceptions, banking mergers and acquisitions if the resulting company would exceed 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies.  The Dodd-Frank concentration limit does not limit internal growth (nor does the Riegle-Neal nationwide deposit cap).  This means, for the largest banks, domestic growth by acquisition is out and organic growth is in.  We cannot dismiss the potential for the muscular use of pricing power as a lever for driving organic growth in our largest banks.

Market pricing power, in an oligopolistic marketplace, is a two-sided coin.  On one side, price increases by the dominant players in a market give competitors an opportunity to "free ride" by tacitly matching the increases, or alternatively, possibly build market share, by declining to match a price increase.  This is the situation we have today in the airline industry.  Shopping airline tickets among airlines is a pretty efficient, automated process, so tangible small-yardage market share gains are there to be had for those who decline to match the price increase.  That's why unmatched airfare increases usually cause the airline initiating the price increase to shortly roll it back.

In banking, at least on the transaction deposit-taking side of the business (the fulcrum of the typical full-service banking relationship), moving one's business has always been a bit of a hassle for a customer, made more so these days with the "stickiness" created by the advent of direct deposit, debit card loyalty programs, electronic bill pay, and ATM fee rebate add-ons.  Let's add to that list the primordial allure of monthly cash payments, like that offered by the much twittered-about new Santander plus $20 account.  With minor prospects for significant market share increases due to this marketplace "friction", price increases by the dominant players in banking may be more likely to be matched than not.

For the regional and community bank competitors that's the happier side of the two-sided coin.  Slow, incremental, price increases initiated by the dominant players, and tacitly matched by other banks, could provide the entire banking industry with wider, more comfortable, operating margins to help deal with increasing regulatory burden.  

It's the other, dark side, of the coin that community banks, in particular, may need to fear and be very alert to in the years ahead.  The dark side of the coin is predatory pricing.  Predatory pricing occurs when a dominant company, or group of dominant companies, either complicitly or tacitly, try to push product prices low enough to drive smaller rival firms out of the market or a smaller segment of it.

One bank's predatory pricing strategy is another bank's "targeted promotion" campaign, right?  It is not inconceivable to think about geographically-targeted price discrimination driven, in part, by Dodd-Frank Section 622 limitations.

Here's a hypothetical... Aided by the benefits of big data and the help of brainy quantitative financial engineers, a dominant megabank player could couple a predatory pricing strategy with a dedicated staff of hundreds of account transfer concierges (to help overcome the stickiness and friction in the customer account transfer process).  You now have the recipe for a barely-perceptible, but potentially highly effective, geographic locality-by-locality process of creating organic growth for the megabanks through a pricing war of attrition.

Once an acceptable level of dominance is established in one geographic area --- the political optics of the process require that token competition is left behind --- the effort marches on to new territory.  To avoid the perception of a pattern, desirable target geographies are randomized.

Just a point to ponder about potential post-financial crisis megatrends in our industry, as you cradle a Christmas eggnog in hand while sitting in your comfortable armchair before the crackling fireplace.  Is the plausible dark side scenario unimaginable?  Let's hope so.

Price surveillance should be a new frontier in terms of data collection by bank regulators, as bank geographic product pricing behavior is presently opaque because it is proprietary.





Thursday, December 5, 2013

He Can be Boston Proud...



...of the fine work produced in such a short time by the authors of the International Peer Review of OCC Supervision of Large and Midsize Institutions.  Hailing from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Comptroller of the Currency, Tom Curry, now has the opportunity to reflect, in the operations of the agency he leads, the example of resolute resilience and courage (as exemplified by Boston's 2013 post-Marathon experience) and the 'roll up your sleeves' hard work of reestablishing the preeminence of a major league championship team (in the tradition of the 2013 World Champion Boston Red Sox).  All without growing a beard, if he chooses not to.

Last month, the National Bank Examiner ran a story called From Hubris to Humility, applauding the Comptroller's efforts to improve the post-financial crisis bank supervision process for large and midsize national banks by initiating a third-party peer review by highly respected members of the global bank supervision community.  Today, Comptroller Curry released the report to the public and also formally accepted it on behalf of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  

While prudently keeping his options open regarding the specifics of implementation, he set a goal of having implementation plans in place within 120 days.  I say prudently, because in government life, it is in the details where you find all of the devils of frustration and many of the speed bumps.

The 23-page report of the International Peer Review of OCC Supervision of Large and Midsize Institutions endorsed several of the bank supervision initiatives taken by the OCC since the financial crisis and emphasized the importance of their effective implementation across the agency.  The authors also noted the highly motivated, experienced, and professional staff who were "eager to respond promptly and fully to the numerous questions posed" by this outside third-party review team. 

The peer review team made seven key recommendations:
1. Revise the mission and vision statements and the strategic goals to make safety and soundness of institutions the OCC’s primary objective, consistent with compliance with applicable laws and regulations, including those regarding fair access and fair treatment of customers.
2. Enhance risk identification by expanding the role of Lead Experts (LEs) and ensuring that they have the capacity to provide meaningful input into the supervision of large institutions through review of examination papers and through the initiation of horizontal reviews.
3. Better integrate the systems for assigning supervisory ratings to institutions (CAMELS ratings) and the Risk Assessment System (RAS), make examination ratings more forward-looking, and devise a more flexible approach to the consequences of certain ratings downgrades.
4. Move examination teams and subject matter experts from individual bank locations to shared OCC offices in the field, where practicable, to improve internal communications, sharing of information among examination teams, and workforce flexibility. This will facilitate horizontal supervisory reviews and help to address staffing shortfalls, particularly in specialized skill areas, by allowing specialists to work on several institutions over a shorter period of time.
5. To further address staffing shortfalls, devise a program to use retirement-eligible staff as mentors and explore how to accelerate the integration of private sector experts into the examination force.
6. Enhance the scope and consistency of supervisory planning, risk assessment and intervention by enhancing the existing peer review process to involve all relevant Examiners-in-Charge (EICs) and Lead Experts, and by elevating key supervisory decisions such as material acquisitions to the Committee on Bank Supervision (CBS) and/or Major Matters Supervisory Review Committee (MMSRC).
7. Ensure that the Enterprise Governance function commences its proposed work on documentation of quality management practices as soon as possible and that the OCC utilizes this to determine the standard and consistency of practices it wishes to put in place across the agency.
While, on the surface, these recommendations look rather straightforward, a few, in fact, create existential angst.  For example, the first recommendation of setting the safety and soundness of institutions as OCC's primary objective.  Well, it's going to be interesting to see if OCC is any more successful in redefining its dual mandate - charter and supervise - as the Federal Reserve has been in redefining its dual mandate of price stability and full employment.  A marketplace-responsive and technology-sensitive national bank charter is a key component in the architecture of keeping banks, like ships, "centered in the channel" and for helping keep the "shadows" out of shadow banking.   A potentially sclerotic national bank charter, made so by mission redefinition, could be as much a danger to systemic financial stability as any possible neglect of bank supervision responsibilities.

OCC's own dual mandate is one reason why I urged last year that the Comptroller consider upgrading of the OCC's Licensing function to Executive Committee status in the National Bank Examiner story entitled License to Heal.

The remaining peer review report recommendations abound with complicating issues, but they are all fundamentally sound.  In fact, some restate longstanding, seemingly intractable, internal concerns.  Hopefully, these report recommendations can be implemented with a minimum of bureaucracy while retaining, and not diffusing, accountability.

A couple of incidental observations on the peer review report:

Interestingly, it seems that the innovative way now-Senior Deputy Comptroller Jennifer Kelly and Deputy Comptroller Bill Haas built the framework of supervision for midsize banks (literally a start-up operation several years ago) shows it to be a better model for large bank supervision rather than vice versa.

Again, through this report, we have a clarion call to revisit the CAMELS rating system, or more properly, the Uniform Interagency Financial Institutions Rating System (UIFIRS).  Getting the federal bank regulatory agencies to sit down and make this rating system responsive to modern risk management and preventive intervention principles seems like trying to make peace in the Middle East.  Adopted 34 years ago, in November of 1979,  and only lightly tweaked since, the UIFIRS is ripe for a sorely needed overhaul (or perhaps a re-imagining, replacing, and scuttling the old system after some statutory linkages are severed).

I echo the Comptroller's thanks to Jonathan Fiechter and his team of global bank supervision experts for creating a quality report within the time-frames established.  It is a template for change for the better.